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California Sea Urchin Commission v. Bean, 883 F.3d 1173
(9th Cir. 2018)
Thomas Mooney-Myers
In California Sea Urchin Commission v. Bean, the Ninth Circuit
upheld the Fish and Wildlife Service’s decision to end an experimental sea
otter colony and translocation program. Commercial fishing groups sought
reversal of the decision due to their interest in maintaining the
translocation program which reduced otter predation on commercially
valuable shellfish. While the Ninth Circuit held the group had standing, it
then applied the Chevron test and determined the agency’s actions were
reasonable.
I.

INTRODUCTION

California Sea Urchin Commission v. Bean arose out of the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“Service”) decision to end an
experimental otter population program in 2013.1 The California
Association of Commercial Urchin Fishermen (“Association”) was
concerned that the cessation of the otter relocation program would directly
lead to a decrease in shellfish harvest in the previously otter-free
management zone due to a likely increase in the local otter population.2 In
its complaint, the Association alleged that the Service lacked the delegated
authority to end the program.3
The Association sought to force the Service to reinstate the
terminated program.4 On remand, the United States District Court for the
Central District of California held that while the Association had standing,
the Service had, under the Chevron test, acted reasonably and had the right
to terminate the program.5 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the holdings of the
lower court.6
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The California sea otter was hunted for its valuable fur during the
1700s and 1800s and was nearly driven to extinction.7 It was listed as an
endangered species in 1977 under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)
and in 1982 the Service developed a recovery plan.8 To assist in otter
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recovery, the Service planned to create a new colony away from the parent
population that would preserve a stable otter population even if an oil spill
or similar event endangered the parent population.9 In 1986, Congress
passed Public Law 99-625, which authorized the Service to implement its
otter relocation and management plan.10 In 1987, the Service approved its
final rule for the experimental population program which included five
“failure conditions,” each serving as a basis for ending the program.11 The
rule outlined the experimental population’s goals and range.12 It further
established an otter-free management zone around the experimental
population that separated the newly-colonized otters from the parent
population.13 Under the 1987 rule, sea otters found in the management
zone would be captured by non-lethal means and released in either the
experimental population or parent population, to prevent the two
populations from merging.14 As a protected species, fishermen who
“incidentally harmed” sea otters were liable under the ESA and the Marine
Mammal Protection Act (“MMPA”).15 However, this incidental take
liability was relaxed within the management zone.16
In 2012, the Service determined that one of the failure conditions
of the 1987 rule had been met and decided to end the program, including
the otter-free management zone and the exemption from incidental take
liability.17 The Association’s initial challenge was dismissed as untimely
based upon the 1987 implementation of the rule, but upon remand the
lower court determined the statute of limitations had actually begun
running at the time the decision to terminate the program was made, in
2012.18
This case arrived before the Ninth Circuit on an appeal of a grant
of summary judgment for the Service by the lower court.19 In the
Association’s initial complaint it challenged the Service’s decision to end
the relocation program, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the
grounds that the Service lacked authority to terminate the program.20 The
Ninth Circuit eventually reversed and remanded the district court’s grant
of a motion to dismiss on timeliness grounds.21 Upon remand, the district
court granted summary judgment for the Service, finding the Association
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had standing, but the Service had acted within its statutory authority to end
the program.22 The Association subsequently appealed.23
III. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit addressed whether the Association had the
necessary standing, if the Service was reasonable in its decision to
terminate the program under the Chevron test, and the validity of the
Association’s arguments under the non-delegation doctrine and an MMPA
amendment.24
A. Standing
In order to establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) it
has suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and (b) actual or
imminent; (2) related to the challenged action; and (3) the harm will likely
be reduced by a favorable decision.25 The Association presented two
theories to establish standing: (1) the return of incidental take liability in
the management zone increased liability for fishermen; and (2) the
increase in otters in the management zone would increase otter
consumption of commercially valuable shellfish, reducing the available
catch for commercial fishermen.26
1. Increased Risk of Liability
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Association’s first argument
because a potential risk of prosecution did not rise to the level of “concrete
and particularized harm.”27 The Ninth Circuit explained that a “genuine
threat of imminent prosecution” must exist for an increased risk of
prosecution to provide standing.28
To assess whether the threat of prosecution would be considered
“genuine,” the Ninth Circuit considered three factors: (1) whether the
Association had a concrete plan to violate the law in question; (2) whether
the authority capable of prosecuting the law had communicated a threat or
warning of impending proceedings; and (3) whether or not there was a
history of past prosecution of enforcement of the relevant statute.29 Even
though the Association offered declarations from members of the fishing
industry, the Ninth Circuit held that these declarations did not demonstrate
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a genuine threat of prosecution.30 The Service had not issued any warnings
or threats, and there was no history of prosecution for incidental takes of
southern sea otters.31
The Association also argued that it had standing due to a threat of
prosecution because they were the objects of regulation,32 citing LA Haven
Hospice Inc. v. Sebelius33 and Abbot Labs v. Gardner.34 The Ninth Circuit
held the Association sought too broad an application of those cited cases.35
The Ninth Circuit further found that the changes in regulations for the
management zone did not require any change in the fishing practices of
the Association, thereby not conveying standing.36
2. Increased Otter Predation of Commercially Valuable Shellfish
The Association also provided testimony on the significant impact
sea otters had on shellfish populations throughout the management zone.37
The Ninth Circuit held this to be a concrete and particularized harm
providing the Association with standing to pursue its claims.38 The Service
argued this did not convey standing because it could not fully exclude sea
otters, but the Ninth Circuit held that in order to demonstrate standing the
Association did not need to “show that the requested relief will inevitably
alleviate the harm complained of.”39 Ultimately, it was held that the
Association’s second theory was sufficient to convey standing.40
B. Chevron Test
The Ninth Circuit then turned to the deferential two-step Chevron
test to determine if the Service’s interpretation of Public Law 9-625 was
reasonable.41 Step one of the Chevron test assesses whether Congress has
spoken directly to its interpretation of the issue at hand.42 If Congress has
not spoken to the issue directly, step two addresses whether the agency’s
interpretation is reasonable.43 Step two of the Chevron test is usually
extremely deferential to the interpretation of the agency in question.44
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In the court’s analysis under step one, the Association argued the
statutory language of Public Law 99-625 was clear and unambiguous,
citing language that the translocation plan “shall include” a management
zone, and the Secretary “shall implement” the plan.45 The Association
argued this mandatory language required the Service to maintain the
program until Congress expressly decides otherwise.46 The Service
responded that the statute gave it discretion to develop and implement a
plan and must give it corresponding discretion to terminate that plan.47
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Association’s arguments because
the statute did not expressly forbid or allow the Service to terminate the
program.48 Application of step two of the Chevron test held that in light
of the goals of the ESA, it was reasonable for the Service to interpret the
statute as conveying the authority to terminate the program.49 The Ninth
Circuit also reasoned that the experimental nature of the program made it
reasonable to expect that the program would not run indefinitely.50 The
court further reasoned that under the Association’s interpretation, the
Service would be required to continue the program even if no otters
remained in the experimental population area.51 The Ninth Circuit then
affirmed the district court’s holding, finding no reason to consider the
Service’s actions unreasonable.52
C. Non-Delegation Doctrine
The Association also presented a constitutional challenge to the
Service’s decision to terminate the experimental population program,
citing the non-delegation doctrine.53 The non-delegation doctrine is
founded upon the principle that Congress cannot delegate its legislative
authority to agencies and must provide an “intelligible principal” upon
which to base their regulations.54 The Ninth Circuit rejected the
Association’s non-delegation argument because the intelligible principle
within a statute “can still be somewhat vague without offending the
Constitution[,]” and further held the statute provided substantial guidance
to the Service, and “there [was] no serious constitutional question to
avoid[.]”55
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D. Marine Mammal Protection Act
The Association also argued that a 1994 amendment to the MMPA
supported its argument of an unreasonable interpretation by the Service of
Public Law 99-625.56 The MMPA amendment relaxed restrictions on
incidental takes, but the rescission of the 1987 rule would make sea otters
subject to the baseline MMPA rules.57 The Association asserted those
MMPA rules were less lenient regarding incidental takes.58 The
Association argued this would not be allowed under the statutory scheme,
because it would conflict with Public Law 99-625.59 The Ninth Circuit
found this argument unconvincing, quoting language in the amendment
stating it “shall not be deemed to amend or repeal” Public Law 99-625.60
IV. CONCLUSION
The holdings of this case demonstrate a strong and continued
practice of deferential treatment toward agencies by ways of the Chevron
test. The holding of this case regarding timeliness better allow plaintiffs to
challenge implementation of older rules. However, a lesser bar to
timeliness still does not overcome the continued low bar agencies must
meet to comply with step two of the Chevron test.
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